14 ideas
18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |